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BENDING THE RULES TO CHANGE THE 
RULE? WAS THE NATIONAL 
FOOTBALL LEAGUE’S DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE POLICY COLLECTIVELY 
BARGAINED FOR? 
 
SEAN P. MCCARTHY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 28, 2014, in response to a wide range of criticisms of the  
National Football League’s (NFL or the League) handling of Ray Rice’s  
domestic violence incident, Commissioner Roger Goodell sent a letter to the 
owners of all thirty-two NFL teams.1  The letter detailed the implementation of 
a new league-wide domestic violence policy.2 The implementation of this new 
policy raises questions regarding Commissioner Goodell’s authority to  
unilaterally amend the League’s Personal Conduct Policy.  This Comment will 
first lay out the background of Rice’s story and the NFL’s implementation of 
the new Domestic Violence Policy.  Using Rice’s story as an application to the  
collective bargaining framework, this Comment will argue that disciplinary  
policies, like the NFL’s Domestic Violence Policy, are permissive subjects of 
collective bargaining and not mandatory subjects.  Therefore, as a permissive 
subject of collective bargaining, the NFL and Commissioner Goodell were not 
obligated to collectively bargain for its implementation in amending the  
Personal Conduct Policy.  Additionally, this Comment will address how the 
NFL, as a private association, mistreated Rice in its retroactive application of 
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1. Roger Goodell Letter to NFL Owners, ESPN (Aug. 29, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/11425532/roger-goodell-letter-nfl-teams-domestic-violence-policy 
[hereinafter Goodell Letter].  
2. Id. 
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the new Domestic Violence Policy. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO RAY RICE’S SITUATION AND THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICY 
On February 15, 2014, Ray Rice was arrested on simple assault charges for 
his role in an altercation with his then-fiancée Janay Palmer at an Atlantic City 
casino.3  Four days later, video evidence of Rice dragging an unconscious Janay 
out of a hotel elevator surfaced on the Internet.4  Rice was indicted on  
aggravated assault charges on March 27, 2014, despite Janay’s desire to not 
prosecute her fiancé.5  The next day, Rice and Janay were officially married.6  
Rice applied for, and was accepted into, a pretrial intervention program that 
could remove the charges from Rice’s record if he adhered to certain  
conditions.7  Under the conditions of the program, Rice had to complete a 
twelve-month program and stay out of trouble during that period.8  On June 16, 
2014, Rice had his discipline hearing with the NFL, where Rice and  
Commissioner Goodell were joined by the Baltimore Ravens’ General Manager 
Ozzie Newsome, the Ravens’ Team President Dick Cass, the NFL’s General 
Counsel, the NFL’s Vice President for Labor Relations, and Janay Rice.9  On 
July 24, 2014, Rice received written notice that the NFL had suspended him for 
two games in the upcoming 2014 season.10   
In the weeks following the announcement of Rice’s suspension, there was 
a great deal of public outcry over the perceived lightness of the NFL’s  
punishment and the League’s perceived domestic violence problem.11  These 
wide-ranging criticisms likely played a major role in Commissioner Goodell’s 
decision to formulate the new Domestic Violence Policy.  In his letter to the 
                                                 





7. Id.  It is worth noting that less than one percent of domestic violence cases in New Jersey from 
2010–2013 received this deal.  John Barr & Don Van Natta Jr., Program Ray Rice in Is Rarely Granted, 
ESPN (Sept. 12, 2014), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/11514871/judicial-figures-show-ray-
rice-deal-offered-rarely.  
8. Bien, supra note 3. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. See, e.g., Travis Waldron, 100,000 People Ask Roger Goodell to Change NFL Policy After  
‘Meager’ Ray Rice Punishment, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 1, 2014), http://thinkpro-
gress.org/sports/2014/08/01/3466615/100000-sign-petition-calling-on-nfl-commissioner-to-address-
domestic-violence/.  
HOFFMAN ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/16/2015  2:11 PM 
2015]       THE NFL’S DOMESTIC VIOLENCE  POLICY  247 
club owners, Goodell acknowledged that Rice’s suspension “led the public to 
question [the League’s] sincerity, [the League’s] commitment, and whether [the 
League] understood the toll that domestic violence inflicts.”12  Goodell further 
admitted that he “didn’t [sic] get it right” with regard to Rice’s punishment.13  
Goodell then attached a memorandum to all NFL personnel that outlined the 
new Domestic Violence Policy, making it effective immediately.14 
Under the new policy, “violations of the Personal Conduct Policy  
regarding assault, battery, domestic violence or sexual assault that involve  
physical force will” result in a six-game suspension without pay for a first  
offense.15  The NFL will take into consideration any mitigating factors and may 
levy longer, or shorter, suspensions where it deems appropriate.16   
Circumstances that may lead to a more severe punishment include: prior  
incidents before entering the NFL; the presence of a weapon; or evidence of 
choking, repeated striking, or committing the act against a pregnant woman.17  
A second offense of the Domestic Violence Policy will now result in  
banishment from the NFL, which may be appealed after one year.18 
On September 8, 2014, just days after the announcement of this new  
policy, a new video of Rice actually striking Janay in the elevator surfaced.19  
That same day, as a result of this new video evidence, the Ravens released Rice, 
and the NFL announced it would be suspending Rice indefinitely.20  The NFL 
announced that the new, longer suspension was based on the fact that the new 
video presented the League with additional evidence not present at the time of 
the original suspension.21  Rice appealed his indefinite suspension a week later 
and requested that Commissioner Goodell not preside over the hearing based on 
his involvement in the investigation.22  Goodell, however, testified at Rice’s  
appeal in early November.23 
                                                 







19. Bien, supra note 3.   
20. Id. 
21. Tom Pelissero & Gary Mihoces, Ray Rice Cut by Ravens, Suspended by NFL Indefinitely, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/ravens/2014/09/08/baltimore-ra-
vens-cut-ray-rice/15291729/.   
22. Bien, supra note 3. 
23. Id. 
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III. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FRAMEWORK 
The obligation to collectively bargain is laid out in the National Labor  
Relations Act (NLRA).24  This duty of collective bargaining is a “mutual  
obligation of the employer and the [representative] of the employees to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment.”25  Further, the NLRA precludes both  
parties from terminating or modifying a collective bargaining agreement26  
unless certain conditions designed to maintain the collective bargaining process 
are present.27 
The scope of the duty to collectively bargain was originally difficult to  
define, specifically what was required within the duty to collectively bargain 
over “other terms and conditions of employment.”28  The Supreme Court first 
discussed the issue of mandatory subjects in the 1958 case of NLRB v. Wooster 
Division of Borg-Warner Corp.29  The Court held that a party’s duty to bargain 
in good faith extended only to mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.30  
However, parties are free to propose and bargain over other subjects, but neither 
party is required to bargain over permissive subjects of collective bargaining.31  
The Court further held that neither party may insist on the resolution of a  
permissive subject of collective bargaining, as doing so would violate the duty 
to bargain in good faith.32   
The Supreme Court expanded upon Borg-Warner to clarify that an  
employer cannot unilaterally modify a mandatory subject to an agreement under 
the duty to bargain in good faith.33  In First National Maintenance Corp. v. 
NLRB, the Supreme Court identified three categories of management decisions 
and determined their classification as mandatory or permissive subjects of  
collective bargaining.34  These categories are as follows: (1) those that have an 
indirect and attenuated impact on the employer–employee relationship; (2) 
those that “are almost exclusively ‘an aspect of the relationship’ between  
                                                 
24. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2013). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. § 158(d)(1)–(4). 
28. See § 158(d). 
29. 356 U.S. 342 (1958). 
30. Id. at 349. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962). 
34. First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677 (1981). 
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employer and employee;” and (3) those that have a direct impact on  
employment.35  Decisions with an indirect impact were deemed to be permissive 
subjects of collective bargaining and thus not subject to the duty to collectively 
bargain.36  Management decisions that are exclusively an aspect of the  
employer–employee relationship are considered mandatory subjects of  
collective bargaining and thus must be collectively bargained for in good faith.37  
The last category requires a balancing test; the issue becomes a mandatory  
subject of collective bargaining “only if the benefit, for labor-management  
relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on 
the conduct of the business.”38  The language of section 8(d) of the NLRA does 
not provide a definitive list of mandatory subjects of collective bargaining;  
however, these mandatory subjects of collective bargaining only cover issues 
that settle an aspect of the employer–employee relationship.39 
Additionally, courts’ holdings regarding what constitutes a mandatory  
subject of collective bargaining versus a permissive subject of collective  
bargaining vary by state.40  Further, not every non-mandatory subject of  
collective bargaining is a permissive subject of collective bargaining.41  State 
statutes may render certain practices unfair labor practices.42  A permissive, but 
lawful, subject of bargaining that is agreed to by the parties may be presented 
by either party, leaving the other party free to accept or reject the proposal.43  
Unions serve as the exclusive representatives of employees in the collective  




                                                 
35. Id. (quoting Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of America, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971)). 
36. Id. at 677–78. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 679. 
39. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. at 178. 
40. Davis M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining by  
Professional Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689, 705–06 (1990). 
41. 20 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 55:32 
(4th ed. 2001).  
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Frederick T. Golder & David R. Golder, Appropriate Subjects for Collective  
Bargaining—Mandatory Subjects, in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION 
§ 2:15 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated July 2015).  
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE DUTY TO COLLECTIVELY BARGAIN TO THE NFL AND 
RAY RICE 
As the NFL Commissioner, Roger Goodell is granted the authority to  
discipline players through three distinct sources: (1) the NFL’s Collective  
Bargaining Agreement (CBA);45 (2) the NFL Constitution and Bylaws;46 and 
(3) the NFL Player Contract.47  Each of these sources grants Commissioner 
Goodell a broad array of authority in handling player discipline.  Additionally, 
the Personal Conduct Policy provides a definitive set of guidelines to govern 
the on- and off-field conduct of players such as Rice.48  Further, in assessing 
these sources, it can likely be concluded that disciplinary matters and their  
enforcement constitute a permissive subject of collective bargaining within the 
NFL context.   
The CBA between the NFL and the National Football League Players  
Association (NFLPA) was most recently agreed to in 2011, following a widely 
covered lockout.49  Article 46 of the CBA covers a commissioner’s disciplinary 
powers and the requisite procedures for imposing disciplinary action.50  Most 
significant is the integrity of the game clause, which grants a commissioner the 
authority to discipline “for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public  
confidence in, the game of professional football.”51  The Commissioner is  
required to promptly send written notice to a player and the NFLPA, and within 
three business days, a player or the NFLPA may appeal the commissioner’s  
decision in writing.52 
 Section 8.13 of the NFL Constitution further details the Commissioner’s 
power.53  Under this provision, the Commissioner has the authority to (1) either 
suspend a player, fine a player for up to $500,000, or both;54 (2) cancel any 
                                                 
45. NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. 46 (2011) [hereinafter NFL CBA]. 
46. CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. 8.13 (2006)  
[hereinafter NFL CONSTITUTION]. 
47. NFL CBA, supra note 45, app. A.  
48. See generally NFL, PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY (2013), https://nfllabor.files.word-
press.com/2013/06/personal-conduct-policy.pdf [hereinafter PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY]. 
49. See Nate Davis, NFL, Players Announce New 10-Year Labor Agreement, USA TODAY (July 
25, 2011), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/thehuddle/post/2011/07/reports-nfl-players-
agree-to-new-collective-bargaining-agreement/1#.VP3XqYHF_Co.   
50. NFL CBA, supra note 45. 
51. Id. art. 46, sec. 1(a). 
52. Id. 
53. NFL CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, art. 8.13. 
54. Id. art. 8.13(A)(1). 
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contract of a player with a member team;55 (3) seek authorization from the  
Executive Committee for harsher disciplinary measures than prescribed by the 
Constitution;56 (4) bar individuals from entry to any NFL or team stadium or 
facility;57 and (5) change, modify, or reduce any suspension not requiring  
member club approval.58 
The integrity of the game clause is further built into the NFL Player  
Contract.59  The language again is rather ambiguous and broad in noting “any 
other form of conduct reasonably judged by the League Commissioner to be 
detrimental to the League or [professional] football” is subject to the  
Commissioner’s disciplinary authority.60  The NFL Player Contract further  
allows the Commissioner “to suspend [a p]layer for a period certain or  
indefinitely; and/or [sic] to terminate th[e] contract.”61 
The determination as to whether disciplinary matters, such as the NFL’s 
Domestic Violence Policy, are mandatory or permissive subjects of collective 
bargaining will depend on certain characteristics.  No single characteristic may 
be viewed as dispositive, but taken as a whole, these characteristics can lead to 
the determination that the NFL’s Domestic Violence Policy amounts to a  
permissive subject of collective bargaining. 
First, the NFL and NFLPA’s CBA is governed under the NLRA because 
the NLRA governs relations between an employer and an employee’s union 
representative.62  The fact that the NFL and the NFLPA, as the exclusive  
bargaining representative of the players, have a valid and enforceable CBA  
requires the two parties to bargain collectively in good faith over mandatory 
subjects of collective bargaining.63  As Casinova Henderson recently argued, 
the NLRA favors the broad powers of the NFL Commissioner in labor  
relations.64   
In Wood v. National Basketball Ass’n, the Second Circuit noted that  
collective bargaining between athletes and their respective leagues raises a  
series of issues for a court, with little to no precedent in standard industry  
                                                 
55. Id. art. 8.13(A)(2). 
56. Id. art. 8.13(B). 
57. Id. art. 8.13(D). 
58. Id. art. 8.13(E). 
59. NFL CBA, supra note 45, app. A. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 44 (1937). 
63. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2013). 
64. Casinova O. Henderson, How Much Discretion Is Too Much for the NFL Commissioner to Have 
over the Players’ off-the-Field Conduct?, 17 SPORTS LAW. J. 167, 180 (2010). 
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relations.65  It is obvious that disciplinary matters are not matters affecting 
wages or hours.  Therefore, to be deemed a mandatory subject of collective  
bargaining, disciplinary matters must fall under the category of other matters 
adversely affecting working conditions of employees.  As discussed previously, 
there is no clearly defined list of mandatory subjects, and some conditions of 
employment may not be considered mandatory subjects of collective bargaining 
in certain jurisdictions.66  Unilateral decisions that affect conditions of  
employment may not be considered mandatory subjects when they “inherently 
and fundamentally relate to the primary mission of the employer.”67  In this  
instance, a court would have to weigh an employee’s interest against managerial 
prerogatives to determine policy.68 
In Teaneck Board of Education v. Teaneck Teacher’s Ass’n,69 the New  
Jersey Supreme Court determined that hiring and firing decisions qualify as 
managerial prerogatives and thus are permissive subjects of collective  
bargaining.70  The Teaneck court also cited to a series of cases that furthered the 
managerial prerogative to decisions about retaining, transferring, and promoting 
or hiring employees.71  Each of these conditions has been determined to fall 
under the scope of a managerial prerogative and is considered a permissive  
subject of collective bargaining.72 
In Robertson v. National Basketball Ass’n,73 members of various teams in 
the National Basketball Association (NBA) and American Basketball  
Association sued under a variety of causes.74  In the course of resolving the 
players’ dispute, the Robertson court noted that mandatory subjects of collective 
bargaining are not wholly immune from other areas of law just because they 
must be collectively bargained over.75  Additionally, the Robertson court held 
that the NBA reserve clause, player draft, and non-merger clauses in the NBA’s 
CBA were not mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.76  In doing so, the 
                                                 
65. 809 F.2d 954, 961 (2d Cir. 1987). 
66. Rabban, supra note 40. 
67. Henderson, supra note 64, at 182 (citing FRANCIS C. AMENDOLA ET AL., Secondary Pressures, 
in 51A C.J.S. LABOR RELATIONS § 487 (2008)). 
68. Id. 
69. 462 A.2d 137 (N.J. 1983). 
70. Id. at 140. 
71. Id.  
72. Id. 
73. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
74. Id. at 872–73. 
75. Id. at 888. 
76. Id. at 890. 
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court noted “‘[t]erms and conditions of employment’ was not meant to reach 
every issue that might interest unions or employers.”77  A parallel can potentially 
be drawn between the classifications of the above items with the NBA’s CBA 
and the NFL’s new Domestic Violence Policy.  The issue of player discipline 
can likely fall into the category of issues decided in Robertson that interest a 
players union but do not necessitate a term and condition of employment  
sufficient to be a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. 
Henderson noted in his 2010 Article that the implementation of the  
then-new Personal Conduct Policy by the Commissioner would seem to  
evidence a “managerial prerogative” that would not require collective  
bargaining.78  In a similar fashion to his implementation of the NFL’s Domestic 
Violence Policy, Commissioner Goodell announced the policy after minimal 
discussion with the NFLPA.79  Under the Personal Conduct Policy, the  
Commissioner went as far as to punish players for actions that occurred before 
the policy took effect.80  However, Henderson noted that no determination has 
been made regarding the implementation of the Personal Conduct Policy.81  
Commissioner Goodell’s decision to implement the new Domestic Violence 
Policy draws a parallel to Henderson’s statement regarding the Personal  
Conduct Policy.  Goodell, on behalf of the NFL, made this unilateral decision 
in an effort to protect the primary mission of the NFL—maintaining the integrity 
of the game.82 
The argument for classifying the Domestic Violence Policy as a  
permissive subject is made stronger in light of ongoing discussions taking place 
between Commissioner Goodell and the NFLPA.  In the recent weeks after  
implementing the policy, Commissioner Goodell and the League’s owners met 
regarding the Domestic Violence Policy.83  Goodell and the owners met to  
discuss potential revisions to the policy he instituted in August 2014.84  The 
Commissioner had even stated that he would like to institute a revised version 
                                                 
77. Id. (quoting Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 220–21, 223–24 (1964); 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 542, 545–48 (4th Cir. 1967)). 
78. Henderson, supra note 64, at 183. 
79. Id. at 172. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 183. 
82. See PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY, supra note 48. 
83. Erik Brady, NFL’s Domestic Violence Policy Could Undergo Numerous Changes, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2014/10/08/domestic-violence-pol-
icy-changes/16950271/. 
84. Id. 
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of the Domestic Violence Policy before the Super Bowl in February of 2015.85  
The League and the NFLPA have also been collaborating with former sex 
crimes prosecutor Lisa Friel in their efforts to revamp the Domestic Violence 
Policy.86  On December 10, 2014, the NFL team owners unanimously endorsed 
a revised version of the Personal Conduct Policy.87  This new policy was the 
product of a series of meetings with various groups and touched on new policies 
for handling domestic violence and similar types of violations.88 
These efforts by Commissioner Goodell strengthened the notion that his 
implementation of the Domestic Violence Policy was a permissive subject of 
collective bargaining.  As previously noted, an employer may voluntarily 
choose to negotiate over a permissive subject of collective bargaining.  This is 
precisely what Goodell chose to do with the NFLPA.  Goodell’s initial unilateral 
decision was permissible in his effort to further protect the integrity of the NFL.  
In doing so, Goodell made a decision that affected terms and conditions of  
employment but related to the primary mission of the NFL.  However, Goodell 
and the NFLPA later attempted to bargain over such a permissive subject in 
good faith.  If such efforts failed, the NFLPA could not insist on any proposed 
changes as a condition to an agreement.89  Rather, Commissioner Goodell would 
be able to either keep the current Domestic Violence Policy or unilaterally make 
further alterations to the policy without violating a duty to collectively bargain 
in good faith under the NLRA.   
Opponents to Commissioner Goodell’s unilateral implementation of the 
NFL’s Domestic Violence Policy could make a variety of contentions that the 
policy constitutes a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.  An initial  
argument could look to the NFL CBA, Article 70, Section 9.90  Section 9 states 
“[t]his Agreement may not be changed, altered, or amended other than by a 
written agreement signed by authorized representatives of the parties.”91   
Commissioner Goodell’s unilateral implementation of the Domestic Violence 
                                                 
85. Id.  
86. Thomas Tracy, Revamp of NFL’s Domestic Violence Policy Could Take Months, Says Ex-Sex 
Crimes Prosecutor Hired by League, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/foot-
ball/revamp-nfl-domestic-violence-policy-months-experts-article-1.1982990 (last updated Oct. 22, 
2014). 
87. NFL Owners Endorse New Personal Conduct Policy, NFL (Dec. 10, 2014), 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000441758/article/nfl-owners-endorse-new-personal-con-
duct-policy.  
88. Id.  
89. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). 
90. NFL CBA, supra note 45, art. 70, sec. 9. 
91. Id. 
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Policy portrays the exact type of amendment the parties collectively bargained 
to prohibit.  The Domestic Violence Policy was implemented without a written 
agreement signed by both parties and was done swiftly, without discussion with 
the NFLPA over its provisions.  An additional argument could be made that the 
parallels between the NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy and Domestic Violence 
Policy indicate a history of unlawful unilateral changes to mandatory subjects 
of collective bargaining.  As Henderson noted in his article, no challenge was 
ever made to the Personal Conduct Policy’s implementation, so it remains  
unclear whether its implementation was lawful under the NLRA’s duty to  
collectively bargain.92   
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) arbitration decision in Golden 
Stevedoring Co. & International Longshoremen’s Ass’n93 draws a  
similar parallel to any potential claim regarding the Domestic Violence Policy.  
At issue in the Golden case was an alleged unilateral change to the company’s 
disciplinary policies.94  The NLRB’s Division of Judges (Judges) noted that the 
duty to collectively bargain, with relation to working conditions, applied only 
where the change was “material, substantial, and . . . significant.”95  The Judges 
also noted that in a prior decision, the Board found that an employer had made 
an unlawful unilateral change when it adopted a new discipline form without 
bargaining with the employees’ representative.96  Thus, one could conceivably 
argue that Commissioner Goodell’s unilateral implementation of the Domestic 
Violence Policy, as a change in the disciplinary policy, was material,  
substantial, and significant to the working conditions of NFL players.  Such a 
finding would render the implementation of the Domestic Violence Policy as an 
unlawful unilateral change to a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.   
While it can conceivably be argued that the Domestic Violence Policy  
constitutes either a mandatory or permissive subject of collective bargaining, it 
is more likely that a court would determine the policy is a permissive subject.  
The NFLPA has not actively objected to its implementation or provisions, and 
has begun openly working with the Commissioner to solidify the policy going 
forward.  Additionally, to prove the Domestic Violence Policy is a permissive 
subject of collective bargaining, Commissioner Goodell can point to his  
implementation of the Domestic Violence Policy to help promote the League’s 
                                                 
92. Henderson, supra note 64, at 183. 
93. See generally Golden Stevedoring Co., & Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO, S. Atl. & 
Gulf Coast Dist., 15-CA-13334, 1998 WL 1985226 (N.L.R.B. July 28,1998). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. (quoting Millard Processing Servs., Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 421, 425 (1993)). 
96. Id. 
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primary mission—maintaining the integrity of the NFL.  These arguments 
would insulate the policy from potential collective bargaining violations under 
the NLRA. 
V. THE RESOLUTION OF RAY RICE’S DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SUSPENSION 
Any potential claims made against the NFL’s Domestic Violence Policy 
under the NLRA would likely be made by the NFLPA as the players’ official 
representative.97  Such a claim would provide little recourse for the current  
situation of Ray Rice and his indefinite suspension.  However, Rice has recently 
pursued successful claims against the NFL to get his suspension overturned 
through an arbitration proceeding; thus, a claim against the NFL framed under 
the law of private associations could be successful.98   
Commissioner Goodell possesses the power to suspend players through the 
NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy.99  Under this policy, a player is “required to 
avoid ‘conduct detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the  
National Football League.’”100  A player may be disciplined even if he is not 
found guilty of a crime.101  The League is able to initiate investigations into 
disciplinary issues involving players, and after concluding an investigation, the 
Commissioner has full authority to impose discipline.102  The policy states that 
discipline may be imposed under a variety of circumstances: (1) “[c]riminal  
offenses including, but not limited to, those involving: the . . . threat of violence; 
domestic violence and other forms of partner abuse . . . [and] disorderly  
conduct;” (2) “[v]iolent or threatening behavior among employees, whether  
inside or outside the workplace;” (3) “[c]onduct that imposes inherent danger to 
the safety and [well-being] of another person;” and (4) “[c]onduct that  
undermines . . . the integrity and reputation of the NFL.”103  Discipline is “based 
on the nature of the incident, the actual or threatened risk to the participant and 
others, any prior or additional misconduct (whether or not criminal charges were 
filed), and other relevant factors.”104  A first offense generally does not result in 
discipline until a case is resolved in court, unless an offense posed an  
                                                 
97. NFL CBA, supra note 45, at xiv. 
98. See generally In the Matter of Ray Rice (2014) (Jones, Arb.), 
http://espn.go.com/pdf/2014/1128/141128_rice-summary.pdf.                                                                          
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“immediate and substantial risk” to the NFL’s reputation.105  The  
implementation of the new Domestic Violence Policy amounts to an  
amendment of the current policy; however, all of the above provisions still apply 
to the Personal Conduct Policy.    
In an article published in 1995, Professor Jan Stiglitz discussed the  
powers that commissioners in the four major American sports leagues possessed 
in handling player discipline.106  Stiglitz also categorized certain misconduct as 
integrity-related misconduct, which included “off the field conduct which might 
effect [sic] the public’s view of the player or the sport.”107  Stiglitz notes that 
integrity-discipline is the most difficult to control because the leagues have an 
interest in protecting their public image, but players have a certain privacy issue 
with regulating off-field behavior.108  Stiglitz’s article discusses the provision 
of the applicable NFL CBA in 1995, which provided for the commissioner’s 
power to fine or suspend a player for conduct deemed “detrimental to the 
League or professional football.”109 
In the twenty years since the publishing of Stiglitz’s article, the powers held 
by the NFL Commissioner have remained relatively the same, if not  
expanded further.  The Commissioner’s disciplinary power is limited in that a 
player must be afforded due process, notice, and an opportunity to defend  
himself.110  This restriction can be similarly drawn to those of commissioners in 
the other three major sports leagues.  For example in Charles O. Finley & Co. 
v. Kuhn, the Seventh Circuit addressed the best interests of the sport clause for 
Major League Baseball (MLB).111  In Finley, MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn 
voided the assignment of three players’ contracts because the assignments were 
“inconsistent with the best interests of baseball.”112  The court held that MLB 
was able to take whatever action it deemed appropriate, so long as it was not 
contrary to the governing state law, federal law, or MLB’s bylaws and provided 
rudimentary due process.113   
The decision handed down in Finley was strengthened by the resulting  
arbitration decision of National Basketball Players Ass’n on behalf of Player 
                                                 
105. Id. 
106. See generally Jan Stiglitz, Player Discipline in Team Sports, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 167 (1995).  
107. Id. at 177. 
108. Id. at 177–78. 
109. Id. at 182–83 (quoting NFL CBA, supra note 45, app. A). 
110. Henderson, supra note 64, at 177. 
111. 569 F.2d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 1978). 
112. Id. at 531. 
113. Id. at 544. 
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Latrell Sprewell & Warriors Basketball Club & National Basketball Ass’n.114  
The Sprewell decision centered on former Golden State Warrior player Latrell 
Sprewell’s altercation with his coach P.J. Carlesimo, which involved Sprewell 
choking and throwing punches at Carlesimo.115  As a result of this dispute, the 
Warriors initially suspended Sprewell for a minimum of ten games.116 NBA 
Commissioner David Stern ultimately suspended Sprewell for an entire year, 
while the Warriors later terminated Sprewell’s contract.117  John Feerick  
presided over the arbitration and ultimately determined that Sprewell should 
only be suspended for sixty-eight games (i.e., the remainder of the NBA season) 
and have his contract reinstated.118  In making his decision, Feerick noted that 
the arbitrary and capricious standard was applicable to Sprewell’s case.119   
Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, courts will choose to  
intervene when an association’s decision is made arbitrarily or capriciously.120  
Feerick further noted that in an employment context, “once a penalty has been 
assessed and accepted, it cannot be increased without the discovery of new  
additional facts that were not readily available to an employer at time of the 
original punishment.”121  Suspending Sprewell for sixty-eight games was still 
“many times the aggregate [suspensions] imposed on the other players for acts 
of physical violence” during the previous two seasons.122   
The broad disciplinary authority granted to the MLB Commissioner in  
Finley is applied in a similar fashion to Commissioner Goodell in the NFL.  As 
discussed above, Commissioner Goodell derives his broad authority to impose 
discipline on NFL players from the CBA,123 the NFL Constitution and  
Bylaws,124 and the NFL Uniform Player Contract.125  Further, Commissioner 
Goodell would be restricted in imposing discipline under the same requirements 
                                                 
114. See MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 575 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n on behalf of Player Latrell 
Sprewell & Warriors Basketball Club & Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 591 PLI/Pat (Pub. L. Inst.) 469 (2000) 
(Feerick. Arb.)).  
115. Id. at 575–76. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 577. 
118. Id. at 581.  
119. Id. at 578. 
120. Id. at 388. 
121. Id. at 579. 
122. Id. at 581. 
123. NFL CBA, supra note 45. 
124. NFL CONSTITUTION, supra note 46. 
125. NFL CBA, supra note 45, app. A. 
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laid out in Sprewell.  So long as Commissioner Goodell did not apply the NFL’s 
Bylaws arbitrarily or capriciously to Rice, did not act contrary to controlling 
law, and provided Rice with rudimentary due process, then the indefinite  
suspension of Rice was within Goodell’s authority. 
On November 28, 2014, Rice received the final ruling from his appeal of 
the indefinite suspension, which declared that his suspension was overturned as 
a result of an abuse of discretion.126  The Honorable Barbara S. Jones served as 
the arbitrator for Rice’s appeal.127  Jones determined that the applicable legal 
standard for league discipline under Article 46 of the CBA required discipline 
to be “fair and consistent.”128  If the imposition of discipline by the  
Commissioner was not fair and consistent, then an abuse of discretion occurred 
because the rules were applied arbitrarily or capriciously.129  Jones additionally 
noted that the burden of proof lies on a player to show that a challenged  
discipline was arbitrary or capricious.130 
The determination regarding the fair and consistent imposition of  
punishment to Rice centered on what information was known to the NFL at the 
time of its June 16th meeting with Rice.131  Jones noted that during his  
arbitration hearing, Rice testified that he told the Commissioner on June 16th 
 
I hit her, [when] she was coming back towards me. . . . and I hit 
her, and she went down and she hit her head, and then by the 
time the elevator got up, the elevator opened, a security guard 
was right there and he said, after I was dragging her out, ‘you 
had assaulted her, get away from her.’”132   
 
Rice further demonstrated with his arm how he hit Janay that night by 
“swinging it in an arc across his body with his hand open” and stated that he 
gave a similar demonstration to Commissioner Goodell during the June 16, 
2014, meeting.133  Given these facts, Jones concluded that the release of the 
September 8, 2014, video inside the elevator did not present any new evidence 
                                                 
126. In the Matter of Ray Rice, supra note 98, at 17. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 8. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 9. 
132. Id. at 10 (alteration in original). 
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to the Commissioner, nor did Rice mislead the NFL during the initial meeting.134 
Jones further ruled that the broad disciplinary power granted to the  
Commissioner did not allow for him to retroactively apply the penalties of the 
Domestic Violence Policy to Rice.135  On numerous occasions throughout their 
dealings, Goodell had assured Rice that his initial two-game suspension would 
not be changed.136  Jones noted that any failure on the part of the NFL to  
understand the level of violence was not due to Rice’s description of the 
events.137  Jones’s final ruling stated “[b]ecause Rice did not mislead the  
Commissioner and because there were no new facts on which the Commissioner 
could base his increased suspension, I find that the imposition of the indefinite 
suspension was arbitrary.”138  Accordingly, Rice’s indefinite suspension was 
vacated, while the conditions of his first punishment remained in effect.139 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Commissioner Goodell’s handling of the Ray Rice situation and the  
resulting implementation of the NFL’s Domestic Violence Policy resulted in a 
great deal of controversy.  The unilateral implementation of the Domestic  
Violence Policy by Commissioner Goodell could draw a challenge under the 
duty to collectively bargain as laid out in the National Labor Relations Act.  
However, the success of such a claim would be reliant on a court’s  
determination of whether changes to a disciplinary policy constitute a  
mandatory or permissive subject of collective bargaining.  A court would most 
likely categorize the Domestic Violence Policy and its implementation as a  
lawful unilateral change to a permissive subject of collective bargaining.   
Commissioner Goodell’s decision to implement the Domestic Violence Policy 
was made in an effort to protect the primary mission of the NFL, protecting the 
integrity of the game.  Such a unilateral decision is considered a permissive 
subject of collective bargaining under Wood.140  Additionally, the later  
discussions and negotiations between Commissioner Goodell and the NFLPA 
since the Domestic Violence Policy’s initial implementation underscore its 
characterization as a permissive subject of collective bargaining. 
Ray Rice’s situation was ultimately resolved through a neutral  
                                                 
134. Id. at 2. 
135. Id. at 16. 
136. Id. at 2, 16. 
137. Id. at 16. 
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140. Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954, 961 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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arbitration, but the handling of the case has left Rice without a team.141  As a 
result of the public outcry to his incident in Atlantic City, Rice may never play 
in the NFL again.142  On January 15, 2015, Rice settled his grievance with the 
Ravens for $3.52 million in back pay owed to him from his overturned indefinite 
suspension.143  The NFL and the Commissioner should use the result of Rice’s 
arbitration appeal as a cautionary lesson in their future disciplinary dealings 
with players.  All parties will be better served if the Commissioner delays  
exercising his disciplinary authority until he is absolutely positive all relevant 
facts and evidence have been obtained.  And once discipline has been imposed, 
the Commissioner cannot then lengthen the original punishment without the 
presentation of new, relevant evidence. 
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